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Background: It is proposed that some individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) can ‘compensate’ for their
underlying difficulties (e.g. in theory of mind; ToM), thus demonstrating relatively few behavioural symptoms, despite
continued core cognitive deficits. The mechanisms underpinning compensation are largely unexplored, as is its
potential impact on mental health. This study aimed to estimate compensation patterns in ASD, by contrasting overt
social behaviour with ToM task performance, in order to compare the characteristics of ‘Low’ and ‘High’ Compensators.
Methods: A total of 136 autistic adolescents, from the ongoing Social Relationships Study, completed a range of
cognitive tasks, the Autistic Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) and a self-report anxiety questionnaire.
Participants were assigned compensation group status; High Compensators demonstrated good ADOS scores despite
poorToMperformance,while LowCompensatorsdemonstrated similarly poorToM, accompaniedbypoorADOSscores.
Results: High Compensators demonstrated better IQ and executive function (EF), but greater self-reported anxiety,
compared with LowCompensators. Such differences were not foundwhen comparing individuals who had good versus
poor ADOS scores, when ToM performance was good. Other core autistic characteristics (weak central coherence,
nonsocial symptoms) didnot differentiate theHigh andLowCompensators.Conclusions: IQ, EF andanxiety appear to
be implicated in the processes by which certain autistic young people can compensate for their underlying ToM
difficulties. This tendency to compensate does not appear to reflect the severity of ‘hit’ for ASD per se, suggesting that
well-compensated individuals are not experiencing a milder form of ASD. The construct of compensation in ASD has
implications for research and clinical practice. Keywords: Autism spectrum disorder; compensation; compensatory
mechanisms; adaptation; remediation; theory of mind; executive function; camouflaging.
Introduction
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is characterised by
impairments in social communication and interac-
tion and repetitive and restricted behaviours and
interests (RRBIs; American Psychiatric Association,
APA, 2013). It is heterogeneous in many ways,
including developmental trajectory. For example,
while most children with an ASD diagnosis continue
to experience substantial social difficulties into
adulthood, a subset may no longer fulfil diagnostic
criteria (e.g. Fein et al., 2013; Gillberg, Helles, Bill-
stedt, & Gillberg, 2016), thus appearing ‘socially
adapted’, in overt behaviour at least.
It is currently unclear why some autistic individuals
show better outcome (e.g. improved social skills) than
others (for review, see Howlin & Magiati, 2017). Else-
where we have explored the candidate mechanism of
‘compensation’ (Livingston & Happe, 2017). Our com-
pensation framework suggests that when an individ-
ual’s symptoms lessen, thismaynotnecessarilysignify
alterationoralleviationofunderlyingcognitivedeficits,
but instead, an enhanced tendency to compensate for
these deficits. Equally, when symptoms worsen, this
may not signal decrement in the underpinning cogni-
tive abilities, but instead, the breakdown of compen-
sation, which was otherwise disguising or minimising
cognitive difficulties. The outcome of compensation,
therefore, is that an individual’s behavioural presen-
tationmayappear less severe thanotherwisepredicted
by their underlying cognitive abilities/atypicalities
(Livingston & Happe, 2017).
The phenomenon of compensation may overlap
partially with that of ‘camouflaging’ (Hull et al.,
2017; Lai et al., 2017). Camouflaging refers to the
behavioural modifications that autistic individuals
may use to ‘blend in’ or appear neurotypical; for
example, dressing like one’s neighbour, suppressing
repetitive behaviours or avoiding taxing social events.
Compensation will also result in a more neurotypical
behavioural presentation, however, it goes further
than masking/suppression of autistic traits and,
instead, involves alternative cognition to circumvent
underlying cognitive difficulties. For example, while
youmightmask a difficulty in distinguishing lies from
jokes by copying the behaviour of others (e.g. laugh-
ing), compensation would involve developing a con-
scious rule: when someone says a nonliteral
statement and is laughing, it is likely a joke (else, it
is likely a lie). In addition,while camouflaging tends to
describe how the whole of one’s autism is disguised,
the compensation framework suggests that a single
cognitiveatypicality canbe ‘compensated for’ (improv-
ing, e.g. social skills), leaving other atypical beha-
viours unchanged (e.g. RRBIs). Crucially, measuring
compensation requires probing both behaviour and
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underlying cognition, in order to quantify the discrep-
ancy between the two.
The construct of compensation in ASD has received
almost no empirical attention. There has, however,
been indirect discussion of compensation-like phe-
nomena; where perceived ability, as demonstrated in
overt behaviour, is substantially better than actual
ability, as measured on cognitive tasks. For instance,
it has been widely proposed that difficulties in infer-
ring others’ mental states, or ‘theory of mind’ (ToM),
are responsible for the reduced social skills observed
in ASD (e.g. Happe, 2015) and there is evidence to
support this (e.g. Mazza et al., 2017; for overview, see
Brunsdon & Happe, 2014). Compensation becomes
relevant when considering that some autistic individ-
uals demonstrate fairly good social skills, despite
clear sociocognitive atypicalities, as measured by
sensitive ToM tasks (e.g. anticipatory gaze based on
false belief attribution; Senju, Southgate, White, &
Frith, 2009; Schneider, Slaughter, Bayliss, & Dux,
2013). It is suggested that compensation allows
individuals to use alternative cognitive routes, inde-
pendent of ToM, to support good social skills in
behaviour. These compensatory strategies, however,
do not appear to allow for the effortless and flexible
mentalising observed in neurotypical individuals. As
such, this type of compensation is envisaged as
shallow and fragile; it may not translate well across
settings and is insufficient to pass sensitive ToM tasks
(Livingston & Happe, 2017). It is possible that some
autistic individuals might compensate more deeply,
such that compensatory processes are sophisticated
enough to support ToM task performance, although
this has never been empirically tested (formore detail,
see Livingston & Happe, 2017).
What are the individual differences that might
contribute to compensation? We suspect that if com-
pensation is to explain heterogeneity (e.g. in develop-
mental trajectory, outcome), relevant cognitive
abilities will be those that vary orthogonally with core
autistic impairments; for example, IQ (Charman et al.,
2011) and executive function (EF; Geurts, Sinzig,
Booth, & Happe, 2014). Good IQ (e.g. Magiati, Tay, &
Howlin, 2014) and EF (e.g. Pugliese et al., 2015)
predict improvement in ASD symptoms across devel-
opment, suggesting a role for these abilities in com-
pensation. Johnson, Jones, and Gilga (2015) have
outlined how higher-order EFs might buffer against
ASD-related brain atypicalities, thus reducing the
severity of autistic symptoms later seen in behaviour.
Ullman and Pullman (2015) have also proposed that
intact EF ability may facilitate retrieval of learned
information or social ‘rules’ frommemory in ASD.
Intriguingly, in the one study that has directly
measured the discrepancy between social behaviour
and underlying difficulties in ASD, termed ‘camou-
flaging’, individual differences in EF, but not IQ,
contributed to camouflaging scores. Among autistic
adults, Lai et al. (2017) measured camouflaging as
thenumericaldifferencebetweenstandardisedscores
of ‘external’ versus ‘internal’ measures; observer-
rated autistic symptoms (using Autism Diagnostic
Observation Schedule, ADOS; Lord et al., 2000) ver-
sus sociocognitive ability (inferred from Reading the
Eyes in the Mind task; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright,
Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) and self-reported autistic
traits. Camouflaging scores were positively correlated
with inhibition-basedEF in females anddepression in
males.
This latter finding begs the question; is the outcome
of compensation always positive? While “cushion[ing]
the effect of the deficit” (Frith, 1991, p. 21) could
facilitate many positive outcomes (e.g. independent
living, employment), compensation might come at a
cost. We speculate that compensating could be highly
taxing, especially if it requires additional cognitive
resources not otherwise used by neurotypical individ-
uals for mentalising. Indeed, exhaustion associated
with ‘appearing normal’ is alluded to in self-reports
from autistic individuals (e.g. Hull et al., 2017).
This study aimed to operationalise compensation
as the discrepancy between sociocognitive ability
(ToM performance) and observer-rated social beha-
viour (ADOS), in a population-derived sample of
autistic individuals, thus overcoming issues of clinic
bias (possible in Lai et al., 2017); the best compen-
sators are less likely to come to clinical attention. We
aimed to compare the cognitive (IQ, EF) and mental
health (anxiety) characteristics of High and Low
Compensation groups; the former reflecting good
(low) ADOS scores despite poor ToM, and the latter,
equally poor ToM alongside poor (high) ADOS scores.
The two groups were also compared on other key
cognitive (weak central coherence) and behavioural
(nonsocial symptoms) features of ASD. To ascertain
whether differences between High and Low Compen-
sation groups reflect something specific about hav-
ing poor versus good ADOS alongside poor ToM,
individuals who had good ToM performance and
either good or poor ADOS were similarly compared
on the aforementioned characteristics.
Finally, we explored evidence for compensation
within the autistic participants’ unaffected co-twins.
These individuals, despite often exhibiting someASD-
related behaviours (Sucksmith, Roth, & Hoekstra,
2011) and neurocognitive atypicalities (e.g. Anzures,
Goyet, Ganea, & Johnson, 2016), present neurotyp-
ically in behaviour. In light of the compensation
framework, there remains an intriguing possibility
that some co-twins have compensated for an aetio-
logical ‘hit’ for ASD such that they appear ‘unaffected’
at the behavioural level, despite underlying cognitive
difficulties (see Livingston & Happe, 2017).
Methods
Participants
Participants were 136 adolescents (112 males) aged 10–
15 years (M = 13.28, SD = 0.93) who met diagnostic criteria
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for Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD; n = 101) or the Broader
Autism Phenotype (BAP; n = 35), alongside their unaffected co-
twins (n = 67). Participants were part of the Social Relation-
ships (SR) Study, a longitudinal investigation of twins with
ASD originally identified from the population-based Twins
Early Development Study (Haworth, Davis, & Plomin, 2013; for
SR Study sample ascertainment, see Colvert et al., 2015).
Autism Spectrum Disorder diagnoses were ascertained
using the Autistic Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R; Lord,
Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994) and Autism Diagnostic Observa-
tion Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000). Autism Genetic
Resource Exchange (http://research.agre.org/agrecatalog/
algorithm.cfm) cut-offs identified those with BAP. ASD and
BAP groups were subsequently collapsed to form one ASD
group (N = 181) to reflect the broad spectrum specified in
DSM-5 (APA, 2013). Co-twins were deemed unaffected if they
failed to get a best estimate clinical diagnosis across multiple
diagnostic sources (see Brunsdon et al., 2015).
AutismSpectrumDisorder participants were selected for this
study on the basis of complete data for the ADOS and chosen
ToM task. A total of 45 individuals were excluded due tomissing
data. This resulted in a final sample of 136 ASD participants,
who did not significantly differ from the excluded group in terms
of gender, v2(1) = 0.26, p = .61, or SES, t(113) = 0.99, p = .32.
The final sample included significantly fewer individuals with
IQ < 70, v2(1) = 23.58, p < .001 (φ = 0.36, p < .001), likely due
to the verbal demands of the ToM task.
Measures
Social-economic status. Social-economic status (SES)
was a composite score from the Twins Early Development
Study database (see Hanscombe et al., 2012).
Intellectual ability. Full-scale IQ (FSIQ) was measured
using the four-subtest version of the Wechsler Abbreviated
Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999). Verbal (VIQ) and
nonverbal IQ (NVIQ) were calculated from WASI subtests. Two
participants could not complete the WASI and instead, FSIQ
was estimated from the British Picture Vocabulary Scales-II
(Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Burley, 1997) and Raven’s Coloured
Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998), with the
former reflecting an estimate of VIQ and the latter, NVIQ.
Autistic symptoms. Autistic symptoms were measured
using Module 3 of the observer-rated Autistic Diagnostic
Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000). For the
present analyses, ADOS scores reflecting social symptoms
only (henceforth, ‘Social ADOS’) were used as nonsocial
symptoms are putatively underpinned by cognitive atypicali-
ties distinct from ToM (Brunsdon et al., 2015). ADOS scores
reflecting nonsocial symptoms only (henceforth, ‘Nonsocial
ADOS’) were used in some analyses.
Theory of mind. Theory of mind (ToM) was measured
using the computerised Frith-Happe Animations (Abell,
Happe, & Frith, 2000), where participants give verbal descrip-
tions of four sequences of a triangle attempting to influence the
mental state of another triangle. These descriptions were rated
on a 3-point accuracy scale (0 = completely inaccurate,
1 = misses the critical point and 2 = key mental state correctly
recognised), such that scores ranged from 0 (poor ToM) to 8
(good ToM). Interrater reliability between the original rater and
three additional raters (calculated for 15% of the total SR Study
sample) ranged from 91% to 95%.
Other cognitive measures. Executive function (EF) was
measured using a battery of tasks, covering inhibition (Luria
Hand Game; Hughes, 1996), set shifting (Intradimensional/
Extradimensional Task; Hughes, Russell, & Robbins, 1994)
and planning (Planning Drawing Task, PDT; Booth, Charlton,
Hughes, & Happe, 2003). On the assumption that EF is a
multifaceted cognitive ability and with no a priori hypotheses
about which aspects of EF might be most relevant to compen-
sation, a composite EF score was created by calculating
performance for each EF task as a % of maximum possible
score and averaging performance across the three tasks. Detail
focus, or (weak) central coherence (CC), was measured using
the Sentence Completion Task (Booth & Happe, 2010) and the
PDT (Booth et al., 2003).
Anxiety. Self- and parent-reported anxiety was measured
using the Anxiety section of the 47-item Revised Child Anxiety
and Depression Scale (Chorpita, Yim, Moffitt, Umemoto, &
Francis, 2000), including five subscales: social phobia, panic
disorder, generalised anxiety disorder, separation anxiety
disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Total anxiety
scores reflected the sum of all subscales. These data have
previously demonstrated medium-to-strong internal consis-
tency (Hallett et al., 2013). Total and subscale scores were
calculated as a proportion of themaximumpossible score based
on items answered, provided < 25%of dataweremissing for that
subscale.
Procedure
See Brunsdon et al. (2015) for details of procedure for cognitive
tasks and diagnostic assessments at home visits. Anxiety
questionnaires were given to participants and their parents to
post back.
Statistical analyses
Participants (N = 136) were first split based on median ToM
performance (Mdn = 4) of 75 age-, IQ- and SES-matched
typically developing (TD) participants from the SR Study,
creating groups with good ToM (> TD median) and poor ToM
(≤ TD median). Participants were also split by median Social
ADOS score of the ASD participants (Mdn = 7), forming groups
with good ADOS (≤ ASD median) and poor ADOS (> ASD
median) scores. The four resulting groups reflect the quadrants
of the ToM by ADOS dimensional space (Figure 1).
Given this study’s primary interest in comparing Low and
High Compensators, planned t-test comparisons between
these groups were conducted for the following variables
using the regress function on STATA: FSIQ, VIQ, NVIQ, EF,
anxiety (self- and parent-report), CC and Nonsocial ADOS.
Equivalent comparisons were performed between the two
groups demonstrating good ToM (Deep Compensation and
Unknown) to ascertain whether any observed differences
between Low and High Compensation groups were simply a
general function of ADOS scores. Where variables were
correlated with VIQ (EF, anxiety and CC), comparisons were
adjusted for VIQ.
Some variables (EF, CC, Nonsocial ADOS and self-reported
anxiety) demonstrated a nonnormal distribution and were
transformed using the Van der Waeden technique. In some
instances, data were still nonnormal and nonparametric
equivalent comparisons were performed instead. Statistical
analyses were performed using STATA 14 and were adjusted
for clustering within twin pairs using robust standard errors
(Williams, 2000).
Results
Key characteristics of the four groups (Low Compen-
sation, High Compensation, Deep Compensation
and Unknown) are shown in Table 1. The groups
did not significantly differ in terms of age, SES and
© 2018 The Authors. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Association for
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the distribution of gender (males/females), twin
zygosity (monozygotic/dizygotic) or co-twin status
(ASD/unaffected). Low and High Compensation
groups did not significantly differ in terms of poor
ToM (p = .09, d = 0.4) and Deep Compensation and
Unknown groups had equivalently good ToM
(p = .53, d = 0.18), fulfilling a critical assumption
on which the study design lies.
Results of the planned t-test comparisons are
shown in Table 2. Effect sizes are reported in terms
of Cohen’s d (0.2 = small, 0.5 = medium and 0.8 =
large; Cohen, 1988). High Compensators scored
significantly higher than Low Compensators in terms
of FSIQ, VIQ (but not NVIQ), EF and self- (but not
parent-) reported anxiety. These groups did not differ
significantly in terms of CC or Nonsocial ADOS. Deep
Compensation and Unknown groups demonstrated
no significant differences in any of the above vari-
ables.
The Unaffected Co-twins group (n = 67) was inves-
tigated in an exploratory manner. The Unaffected
Co-twins spanned almost the full range of ToM
scores (Mdn = 5, range = 1–8) and the lower half of
possible ADOS scores (Mdn = 0, range = 0–9). A total
of 29/67 had ToM scores the same as or below the
TD median (Mdn = 4), such that they lay in the
quadrant space for the High Compensation ASD
group, with 9 of these demonstrating ToM as poor as
the lowest scoring quarter of the ASD participants
(ToM score = 0–2).
Discussion
This study aimed to explore an intriguing subgroup of
young people with ASD, who, despite continued
difficulty understanding other minds, display rela-
tively few social symptoms in behaviour, and are
therefore putatively ‘High’ Compensators. Our results
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suggest that, compared to age- and SES-matched
autistic participants with equally poor ToM but sub-
stantially more severe social symptoms (‘Low’ Com-
pensators), High Compensators demonstrated higher
verbal (but not nonverbal) IQ, better EF and greater
self-reported anxiety. Crucially, the differences
betweenHighandLowCompensatorswere not simply
a function of levels of ADOS-assessed social skills; the
other two groups in this sample (DeepCompensation,
Unknown), similarly split on ADOS but demonstrat-
ing good ToM, were comparable in terms of the
aforementioned variables. Therefore, it appears to be
the specific combination of performing well on the
ADOS, despite poor ToM, that is associated with
higher IQ, EF and anxiety.
Although the present associations cannot speak to
causal effects, it seems plausible that individual
differences in IQ, particularly verbal IQ, could influ-
ence compensation, for example, via the use of
learned social rules and scripts. Whether the good
ADOS performance of the High Compensators was
reflecting surface-level ‘masking’, as suggested by
the camouflaging literature (e.g. suppressing autistic
behaviours) or instead, active strategies that allow
one to appear socially skilled (i.e. compensation; e.g.
deliberate eye contact) warrants further investiga-
tion. Indeed, there may be some items on the ADOS
that could be passed through simply suppressing
certain behaviours and others that would require an
active compensatory strategy.
The EF results are in line with the suggestion that
EF ability has an important compensatory function
(Johnson, 2012; Ullman & Pullman, 2015). In par-
ticular, our data suggest that there is something
particularly beneficial about having good EF/IQ
when underlying ToM ability is poor and that EF
might have an influence over and above (verbal) IQ,
in line with Lai et al. (2017). However, there remain
important questions about whether these cognitive
abilities necessarily precede compensation. It is
plausible that an early form of compensation might
facilitate social interaction, thereby providing an
improved learning environment for acquiring the
skills measured in IQ/EF tests.
The results also support the possibility of a cost to
compensation. The fact that heightened (self-
reported) anxiety was found in the High versus Low
Compensators, while controlling for verbal IQ, sug-
gests that there was not simply a bias towards
individuals with higher IQ having greater ability to
self-report. This link between compensation and
anxiety, however, could be directional or bidirec-
tional. On the one hand, compensating for core ToM
difficulties could have downstream effects on well
being. Compensation may require high amounts of
additional cognitive resources (e.g. EF) and therefore
be prone to break down when these resources are
depleted, hence promoting fatigue and anxiety.
Alternatively, those individuals who experience
greater anxiety might be more motivated to compen-
sate, or anxiety could mask autistic symptoms in the
ADOS. Finally, it is intriguing that group differences
between High and Low Compensators were not
found for parent-reported anxiety. On inspection of
the mean values, it appears that lack of significant
differences may be due to parents underestimating
anxiety among High Compensators.
An alternative explanation for the present findings
would be that High Compensators are simply expe-
riencing a milder form of ASD, i.e. that they have a
lesser cognitive or aetiological ‘dose’ of ASD for which
to compensate. This, however, seems unlikely for a
number of reasons. High Compensators exhibited a
ToM deficit considerably more severe than that of
many other participants. In addition, there is no
doubt across multiple diagnostic measures (see
Methods) that High Compensators did have ASD,
despite doing well on the ADOS. Finally, the data
suggest that High and Low Compensators were
equivalent in the manifestation of other core autistic
Table 1 Participant characteristics
Low
Compensation
High
Compensation
Deep
Compensation Unknown ANOVA
N M (SD) N M (SD) N M (SD) N M (SD) F p g²
Age (years) 40 13.29 (0.84) 41 13.24 (0.99) 33 13.21 (0.96) 16 13.46 (0.95) 0.33 .81 0.01
SES (composite score) 27 .08 (0.76) 31 0.20 (0.69) 23 0.15 (0.79) 14 0 (0.76) 0.88 .46 0.04
Social ADOS 40 12.13 (2.99) 42 4.43 (1.94) 34 4.85 (1.65) 20 10.35 (2.06) 99.54 <.001 0.75
ToM 40 2.15 (1.17) 42 2.67 (1.39) 34 5.91 (0.93) 20 5.75 (0.85) 137.53 <.001 0.80
Current ADI-Ra 39 16.28 (7.99) 40 11.03 (6.23) 34 12.15 (7.18) 20 12.25 (8.00) 3.41 .02 0.09
Male:Femaleb 4.71:1 3.67:1 4.67:1 9:1 –
DZ:MZ twinb 2.08:1 2:1 4.5:1 1.71:1 –
Co-twin has ASD:Unaffectedb 1.92:1 0.95:1 1.14:1 1.5:1 –
ANOVAs are adjusted for clustering within twin pairs.
Low Compensation, poor ToM+poor ADOS; High Compensation, poor ToM+good ADOS; Deep Compensation, good ToM+good ADOS;
Unknown, good ToM+poor ADOS; DZ, dizygotic; MZ, monozygotic; Unaffected, does not meet ASD or BAP criteria.
Higher scores reflect higher SES/more severe ADOS or ADI-R symptoms/better ToM ability.
aADI-R scores reflect current parent-reported social symptoms (sum of domains A and B from Current Behaviour Algorithm of the
Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised; Lord et al., 1994).
bChi-Square tests, all group interactions nonsignificant (p > .40).
© 2018 The Authors. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Association for
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features, such as nonsocial symptoms and detail
focus (or weak central coherence). Interestingly, the
groups were as likely to have a co-twin who also had
ASD, suggesting similar genetic ‘hit’ for ASD. There-
fore, instead of High Compensators having a ‘milder’
form of ASD, they appear to be experiencing similar
underlying cognitive difficulties (i.e. ToM difficulties)
to Low Compensators but have an enhanced ability/
propensity to compensate in their overt behaviour, at
least in the context of the ADOS.
Results from the Unaffected Co-twins group sug-
gest that a substantial proportion had underlying
ToM difficulties, despite appearing ‘neurotypical’ in
behaviour, highlighting the intriguing possibility that
genetically predisposed (but unaffected) individuals
may be compensating for some residual cognitive
difficulties. As these individuals did not meet diag-
nostic criteria for ASD, any compensation taking
place is probably reliant on fairly sophisticated
strategies (deep compensation), rather than learned,
inflexible social rules (shallow compensation).
A major strength of this study is that, due to the
population-based nature of the SR Study, not all
autistic participants had a prior clinical diagnosis,
allowing for compensation tobe exploredamong those
that had not come to clinical attention. There are,
however, a few limitations. Although the overall sam-
ple size was reasonable, segregating participants into
four groups substantially reduced statistical power. It
could be argued that finding no group differences
between Deep Compensation and Unknown groups
was due to these groups having smaller sample sizes,
however, the effect sizes comparing the two were also
small.Equally, althoughHighandLowCompensators
did not differ statistically in their ToM ability, we
acknowledge the possibility that our group sizes may
have been too small to detect a real difference. In
addition, although our predictions concerned Low
versus High Compensators, not taking into account
multiple comparisons across the four groups may
have increased Type 1 error. Finally, given the verbal
nature of the ToM task, the majority of autistic
participants with low IQ from the SR Study could not
be included, making our findings unrepresentative of
this portion of the autism spectrum.
The current findings have important clinical and
theoretical implications. First, they suggest that the
ADOS, a one-to-one assessment in a quiet setting with
a trained individual, may not always reveal real
underlying sociocognitive difficulties for some autistic
individuals. It remains to be seen whether compen-
satory strategies used in the ADOS translate to
unstructured everyday social situations, such as
school or work environments (Dean, Harwood, &
Kasari, 2017). It ispossible that for certain individuals,
any compensation is fairly shallow and may break
down in complex situations where social cues are
unpredictable, ambiguous and/or fast-paced (see Liv-
ingston & Happe, 2017). With this said, in the current
sample, the HighCompensators also appeared to have
better observable social skills thanLowCompensators
according to parent ratings (Current ADI-R; see
Table 1), which should capture the individual’s beha-
vioural profile across multiple settings.
The findings also stress the importance of cogni-
tive, alongside behavioural assessments, when
understanding individual differences in ASD. In this
study, participants’ ToM performance added sub-
stantial information, in combination with ADOS
scores, in predicting key cognitive and mental health
characteristics. The notion of compensation might
shed light on underdiagnosis of ASD, for example,
among females. This study did not find females were
more likely to be High versus Low Compensators,
although power was limited (24 females). The find-
ings also highlight that self-report may be particu-
larly informative, at least for detecting anxiety
among the subgroup of young people with ASD who
tend to compensate. This anxiety may be overlooked
by parents. Finally, the findings also inspire theo-
retical questions about (a) whether interventions
aimed at improving social skills are actually tapping
compensatory mechanisms, and (b) whether such
interventions necessarily have a positive outcome,
for example, for mental health.
On a final note, as previously outlined, a sensitive
cognitive probe is essential for being able to measure
compensation, defined as the difference between
behavioural presentation and underlying cognitive
ability (Livingston&Happe, 2017). TheToMtaskused
in this study is sufficiently novel to be relatively
immune to learned strategies, and is among the most
sensitive in the field for revealing underlying ToM
difficulties among autistic individuals. However, as
some participants (e.g. those in the Deep Compensa-
tion group) performed reasonably well on the ToM
task, the possibility remains that participants’ task
performance could itself be supported by some com-
pensatory processes. Future research aimed at refin-
ing the sensitivity of ToM measures, as well as
exploring the distinction between deep and shallow
compensation, is required; for example, establishing
whether ‘deep compensators’ dowell across a range of
(implicit and explicit) ToM tasks and whether difficul-
ties are revealed with increasing task sensitivity.
Conclusions
Thisstudyoperationalisedcompensationas improved
behavioural presentation of ASD, despite persistent
core cognitive deficits. We used observer-rated social
symptoms and ToM task performance as measures of
the behavioural and cognitive levels, respectively,
although ToMdeficit is just one ASD-related cognitive
atypicality (ofmany) thatmaybe compensated for and
could be studied. The results suggest that IQ, EF and
self-reportedanxietyare implicated in theprocessesof
compensating for ToM difficulties in ASD. Further
research, including a developmental longitudinal
approach incorporating multiple ToM tasks, should
© 2018 The Authors. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Association for
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aim to delineate the exact nature of compensatory
mechanisms, so that the theoretical and clinical
relevance of the concept of compensation to under-
standing ASD can be established.
Acknowledgements
L.A.L. is supported by a doctoral studentship from the
Medical Research Council. The authors would like to
thank the rest of the Social Relationship Study Team for
their contributions: Victoria Brunsdon, Tracy Garnett,
Nicola Gillan, Victoria Hallett, Stephanie Lietz,
Catherine Stewart and Emma Woodhouse. L.A.L. would
like to thank Punit Shah for invaluable discussion. The
authors have declared no competing or potential con-
flicts of interest.
Correspondence
Lucy Anne Livingston, Social, Genetic and Develop-
mental Psychiatry Centre, Institute of Psychiatry,
Psychology and Neuroscience, King’s College London,
De Crespigny Park, London SE5 8AF, UK; Email:
lucy.livingston@kcl.ac.uk
Key points
• We operationalised a novel definition of ‘compensation’ in ASD as improved behavioural presentation (here,
good social skills), despite persistence in core cognitive deficits (here, theory of mind difficulties).
• A subgroup of young people with ASD compensate well, displaying reasonable social skills in behaviour,
despite clear difficulties on a theory of mind task.
• Greater ability/propensity to compensate is associated with higher verbal IQ, better executive function and
greater self-reported anxiety.
• These results have implications for understanding underdiagnosis and mental health difficulties in ASD, as well
as the mechanisms that may underpin social skills training.
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